Imposition of registration requirements is not punishment for crime but is itself a crime. The motives for doing, however prestine, are irrelevant. The intent is plainly criminal.
Ex-felon registration laws most heavily impact those receiving lesser access to justice in the first instance --- frequently through an abuse of the law or legal process --- which could be fairly denominated human trafficking by another name. The World Bank (pdf) classifies all forms of non-consensual exploitation as Human Trafficking ...
Re-socialization into ex-felon status begins by detaining an individual in a cage where advised he likely will never get out unless he participates in a plea bargaining process that authorizes judicial deprivations without jury trial or confession of factual guilt. North Carolina v. Alford. Outside the judicial process, and most recently by legislative fiat, the individual is told he will be put back in a cage or killed unless he complies with ex-felon registration laws, for the benefit of others, without means of review, or just compensation. NRS 179C.010 et seq; NRS 179D.010 et seq.
When presented with ex post facto challenges to sex offender registration laws, the Supreme Court agreed with sponsors that those laws were intended as civil public safety regulations that did not impose punishment for a prior offense. Smith v. Doe, 538 US 84 (2003). After being assured the targeted individuals in Smith were not required to appear and register in person, the Court focused on the stigmatizing effect of publishing their personal and criminal history information on a public website, which it found acceptable because the offenders' criminal history was already available at the local court house where everyone's civil and criminal history is available. Because that would include a court clerks existing website, the reasonableness of a new website limited to the limited criminal history of a limited population seems strained. And the Court openly acknowledged a potential challenge to an obvious flaw with an intent to publish data forcibly extracted from the subject population: "Whether other constitutional objections can be raised to a mandatory reporting requirement, and how those questions might be resolved, are concerns beyond the scope of this opinion." Id.
Surprisingly, despite numerous efforts, or precisely because of those efforts, the Court has yet to consider the mental, physical and economic impact of compliance upon each targeted individual, the value of that conscripted civil data service to government, and whether mandatory compliance asserts a limited right of ownership over the targeted individual to create a condition of civil Servitude in plain and direct violation of the 13th Amendment:
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
Nor has the Court determined whether the AWA usurps State sovereignty by requiring legislative repudiation of state court judgments or re-determination of inherent fact issues finalized during its criminal justice process: individualized offender dangerousness according to the wisdom of the law then in effect. We assert the answer is patently Yes, and further, the affected judgments of conviction are now constitutionally incestuous and VOID.
Nor has the Court determined whether the AWA usurps State sovereignty by requiring legislative repudiation of state court judgments or re-determination of inherent fact issues finalized during its criminal justice process: individualized offender dangerousness according to the wisdom of the law then in effect. We assert the answer is patently Yes, and further, the affected judgments of conviction are now constitutionally incestuous and VOID.
Confusion seems to have arisen here from a focus on the ex post facto clause's prohibition of additional punishment for a past offense because a selective deprivation is punishment per se and prohibited by the bill of attainder clause in Art 1 Secs 9 and 10. See, Nixon v. Administrator, 433 US 425 (1977); United States v. Lovett, 328 US 303 (1946); Commings v. Missouri, 71 US 271 (1867).